How to build the future is the stuff of politics, yet as a serious study it is almost entirely ignored. Major infrastructure projects are often launched down the runway to fit an electoral agenda, too sketchily worked out to survive the inevitable barrage of criticism. But each disaster makes the next project more difficult. Every big idea should be anchored to the drawing board until its case can be forensically defended.
Westminster politicians often look enviously across the Channel at the success of large infrastructure investment. For years, high-speed rail projects linking regional capitals and spreading economic growth have been seen as icons of success. It should be remembered that each originates at least partly in a piece of grand political symbolism – Spain's triumphant new democracy, Germany turning political reunification into economic reality. The persuasiveness of the vision helped to make the cost of achieving it bearable, but it has never made it uncontentious. Politicians here are about to find out whether some of their most ambitious projects have a persuasive enough political case and a robust enough design to survive.
The UK's notorious record of undercommitting to infrastructure investment means we languish at 24th in a global league table. The Treasury has a legendary hostility to big projects, partly a legacy of huge overspends in the past. No surprise, then, that, although the idea of a new high-speed rail network has been on the political agenda since 2003, when the Strategic Rail Authority first projected that the west coast mainline would be at capacity by 2016, it was only after recession hit in 2009 that the case became pressing. And although the Labour peer Andrew Adonis, who as transport secretary at the time was its architect, insisted at the weekend that the detailed costings he commissioned then remain robust, his case has been under sustained pressure all summer, not least from former allies such as Alistair Darling. A glance at the National Audit Office's devastating first review of programme preparation shows why. The NAO has never been a fan of the project, but it's an excoriating report, condemning the feebleness of the demonstrated relationship between the economic case – faster journeys – and the strategic case of economic renewal. This benefit-cost ratio has been repeatedly revised downwards, as "errors" are found in assumptions about increased passenger travel and the advantage of faster journeys. The department itself has several other big projects in hand, a high turnover of its most senior staff, and an embarrassing series of recent blunders (fancy a rail franchise?). All that makes it an easy target for rightwing organisations, from the Institute of Economic Affairs to the latest declared opponents, the Institute of Directors, whose members, it's reported today, overwhelmingly think there's nothing in it for them.
But at least the coalition has finally woken up to the significance of infrastructure spending. In June's spending review, £100bn was promised on new projects. That's still not back at the levels Labour was planning but it's a welcome change of heart. Official figures show public sector net investment has fallen from 3.4% of GDP in 2009-10 – about £49bn – to less than 2% in 2011-12, and until June, it was forecast to fall further still over the next five years. Yet one recent report called for at least 3% of GDP to be invested across Europe to meet anticipated demand in 2030 and no one who travels regularly will doubt the importance of investment in infrastructure.
There is a political argument to be had here, and an argument about capacity, and they need to happen together. No one would question that reliable power supplies, fast broadband and good communications are preconditions of economic success. But the combination of a Treasury that often looks institutionally opposed to investment and a government machine that can seem to lack the tools to manage it efficiently fatally undermines even the most visionary political ambition.
0 comments:
Post a Comment